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There is an old trick for stimulating discussion in otherwise moribund seminars: 
assign two readings which, taken together, comprise an important "debate." In the 
study of Southeast Asia, for example, the most famous such pairings—the Feith-Benda 
debate, Scott vs. Popkin—have, no doubt, proven convenient for teachers and 
instructive for students in numerous courses over the years. As in cockfights, it 
appears, the key lies in finding a well-paired match, sharpening the instruments of 
combat, and nudging the contestants to display their plumage and "thrash it out" on 
the open floor.
Geoffrey Robinson's important and timely new book, The Dark Side o f Paradise: 
Political Violence in Bali, certainly deserves its day in the classroom arena. But who or 
what would serve as a suitable match for this formidably researched, powerfully 
argued study? Clifford Geertz's work suggests itself as an obvious candidate, 
especially as Robinson has mustered a barrage of evidence and arguments which 
attack anthropological studies of Balinese society. Indeed, Geertz's famous cockfights, 
funerals, peddlers and princes, and theater states provide useful points of potential 
contrast and debate with Robinson's more historically—and politically—grounded 
account of Bali. Yet, as argued in this brief review essay, his book has considerable 
relevance beyond the shores of the much exoticized isle and should be posed against 
Geertz in a larger arena, where rival understandings of Indonesian politics and of 
Southeast Asia's post-colonial predicament are ultimately at stake.
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Invented Traditions, Constructed Castes: Dutch Colonial Bali
As Robinson makes clear in the book's preface, one key aim of his study is to 
debunk the twin myths of social harmony on Bali and of timeless Balinese culture and 
tradition. Drawing on a wide variety of both historical sources (mostly in Dutch) and 
available scholarship, Robinson instead underscores the extent of internecine warfare 
and the importance of the slave trade in Bali in the centuries preceding the imposition, 
in 1908, of a colonial state apparatus over the entire island. Following in the paths of 
specialists on Java, India, and other parts of the colonized world, he chronicles the 
"invention of tradition" by interested colonials and the entrenchment and legal 
codification of "a caste hierarchy and a set of rules regarding caste relations and 
prerogatives which in practice had never before existed." (33)
The notion of Bali's cultural uniqueness, Robinson shows, received crucial support 
from the Dutch cultural and educational policies known as Baliseering (Balinization) 
and the "restoration of tradition" in the 1920s and 1930s, policies adopted by colonial 
officials pushing for "preservation" (rather than Christianization) of Balinese culture 
and religion as a strategy to stem the spread of Islam and nationalism from 
neighboring Java. The "creation of legal social categories and the attachment of 
differential privileges and obligations to them" (63), he makes clear, owed much to the 
Dutch formation of customary law courts staffed by ordained Hindu priests and to the 
Dutch policies of indirect rule which left local rajas with considerable discretion over 
land, revenue collection, and corvee labor mobilization. Finally, the pattern of indirect 
rule through eight separate kingdoms and the return to a "traditional" system of royal 
hereditary rule, Robinson argues, "ensured that puri (noble house) rivalry would 
remain at the heart of Bali's political life through the colonial period and well beyond." 
(47)
Yet the strength and originality of Robinson's work do not rest solely—or even 
largely—upon his above-noted success in discrediting overly ahistorical and apolitical 
anthropological accounts of Bali or in deconstructing the colonial origins and 
conservative implications of "Balinese tradition and culture." In fact, as Robinson 
notes, several anthropologists have already worked to historicize the notion of Bali's 
cultural uniqueness, and a number of anthropological accounts have remarked upon 
(if not endeavored to explain) the importance of political conflict and violence in 
Balinese society.1 In studying regions beyond Bali, moreover, other scholars have 
surpassed Robinson in exploring the nexus of "culture and politics" and the problem 
of "invented traditions" in Indonesian society.2 By now the project of deessentializing 
and historicizing "culture" is, of course, widely accepted, and practiced, by 
anthropologists, leaving historians and political scientists such as Robinson with not 
much of a "straw man" to attack. Understood solely as an historian's (or a political 
scientist's) attack on cultural anthropology, Robinson's book is too little—or too late— 
in terms of a cross-disciplinary challenge.
1 See, for example, James A. Boon, The Anthropological Romance of Bali, 1597-1972: Dynamic Perspectives in 
Marriage and Caste, Politics and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and Adrian 
Vickers, Bali: A Paradise Created (Victoria: Penguin, 1989).
2 See, for example, John Pemberton, On the Subject of "Jam" (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
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Political Violence: Robinson's Bali in Comparative Perspective
Understood in its own terms, however, The Dark Side o f Paradise offers far more 
than a "through a glass, darkly" view of Balinese culture and society. As Robinson 
clearly states in his introductory chapter and reiterates in his conclusion, the book aims 
to address three important questions about Balinese history:
How can we account for the dramatic variation in the pattern of political conflict in 
Bali, from apparent harmony to open political conflict? What explains the 
historical tendency for political conflict in Bali to follow class, caste, and 
ideological lines, and to override the sense of Balinese solidarity based on an 
awareness of ethnic, religious, or regional community? And finally, what were the 
historical and structural causes of political violence in Bali? (307)
In answering these questions and providing explanations for the patterns he describes, 
Robinson makes a set of arguments whose relevance goes far beyond the confines of 
twentieth-century Bali. In fact, his arguments provide the basis both for reassessing our 
understanding of the Sukarno era and for refining the tools for exploring local politics 
in contemporary Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia.
The dramatic variation in patterns of political conflict in Bali, Robinson shows, has 
closely corresponded to decisive shifts in the power and orientation of central states in 
the Indonesian archipelago. Thus Robinson locates the source of "social harmony" in 
Bali not in the island's "traditional culture," but in the strength and solidity of 
successive colonial states, Dutch, Japanese, and, arguably, Orde Baru. Similarly, 
Robinson attributes periods of political turmoil in Bali not to enduring "primordial" 
cleavages and sentiments, but to the absence, weakness, rivalry, and/or disunity of 
central states, as witnessed in the period stretching from the Revolution through the 
massacres of 1965-66.
More pointedly, Robinson demonstrates the importance of overarching state 
structures and policies—rather than enduring cultural or societal features—for 
determining the pattern of political conflict in Bali. The Dutch (and Japanese) reliance 
on a system of indirect rule for extracting labor and revenue from the island, he argues, 
precluded the emergence of Bali-wide regional sentiments and prefigured both the 
recrudescence of long contained rivalries within the aristocracy, and the release of 
greatly sharpened class and caste cleavages and resentments, during the Revolution 
and in the early post-independence period. The weakness of Bali-wide state 
institutions left the island's post-independence political leaders highly vulnerable to 
fluctuations in national politics and (along with local capitalists) heavily dependent 
upon the center for patronage and protection.
Yet Robinson avoids an overly deterministic emphasis on Dutch colonial legacies 
by tracing the impact of central state pressures and fissures on political conflict in Bali 
in the Sukarno era. The central state's porous and fragmented control over the 
bureaucracy, most dramatically and decisively in the case of police and military forces, 
combined with political party competition for state office and resources to heighten the 
potential for conflict and violence. PKI cadres and sympathizers working from within 
the state used public offices, resources, and prerogatives to enhance class 
consciousness and to engender class conflict, most notably in the aksi sepihak 
campaigns of 1964-65. While the severity of the post-coup violence in Bali "appears to
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have been in direct proportion to the radicalism and success of the land-reform 
campaigns" (272), Robinson shows conclusively that the massacres on the island took 
place through the initiative and orchestration of (local and Java-based) military 
authorities. Thus Robinson explains why Bali (along with Central and East Java) was 
the site of the greatest carnage in 1965-66 by situating local conditions within a 
broader pattern of national-level politics.3
Overall, The Dark Side o f Paradise offers perhaps the single most compelling—and 
instructive—study of local politics in Southeast Asia. While painstakingly researched 
and documented, Robinson's work reaches beyond history, amply illustrating the 
possibilities of what might be termed a "comparative historical sociology" approach. 
Robinson's essential questions are, after all, explicitly comparative, addressing the 
issue of variation in patterns of political conflict and violence, and his arguments 
include comparisons across historical periods (i.e. "within the case"), counterfactual 
asides, and references to alternative local trajectories (most notably the regional 
rebellions of the 1950s).
Ultimately, Robinson's explanations provide a powerful set of tools for scholars 
interested in examining local patterns of political continuity and change elsewhere in 
Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia as well. Careful attention to the particular 
colonial-era reorderings of local social, cultural, and economic relations, Robinson 
shows, provides an essential backdrop for any analysis of post-independence "local 
politics." A narrow focus on local state institutions and social configurations, he notes, 
must be combined with an appreciation for the importance of national-level political 
and economic trends as well as the nature of center-local relations. Be it for Bali in the 
Suharto era, PAS versus UMNO in Kelantan, chao pho in Chonburi, or "provincial 
warlords" in Camarines Norte, Robinson's careful gridding of local political 
landscapes and chronicling of provincial political trends offers an exemplary model for 
other scholars to follow.
Robinson vs. Geertz: The Phantoms of Aliratt, Class, and State
Yet if, as the saying goes, "all politics is local," then Robinson's study of Bali offers 
a sharply focused lens through which to reexamine early post-independence politics in 
Indonesia as a whole and throughout Southeast Asia. In this regard, his choice of Bali 
as a case study may well prove to be fortuitous, for the island serves not so much as 
"Indonesia writ small," but as an exception which could prove a new rule. Here 
Robinson's arguments can be most fruitfully counterposed against those of Clifford 
Geertz: not the Geertz of Balinese cockfights, funerals, and theater states, but the 
Geertz who wrote so memorably about Javanese town histories, Indonesian aliran, and 
"primordial sentiments" in the "new states" of Southeast Asia and beyond.
In his classic case study, The Social History o f an Indonesian Town, Geertz sketched 
out a pattern of early post-independence social organization and political competition
3 See: Kenneth Young, "Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965," in Robert Cribb (ed.), The 
Indonesian Killings o f1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Papers on Southeast 
Asia No. 21,1990), pp. 63-99; and Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, "The Destruction of the Indonesian 
Communist Party, PKI: A Comparative Analysis of East Java and Bali" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1992).
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in Indonesia that he termed "the aliran system."4 Literally a stream or current, an aliran, 
he noted, "consists of a political party surrounded by a set of sodalities—that is, 
voluntary organizations—formally or informally linked to it."5 In the Javanese town 
where Geertz (and others) conducted field work in the 1950s, the four main parties 
were those which fared most impressively in the national arena: the Partai Nasionalis 
Indonesia (PNI), the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the "modernist" Islamic party 
Masjumi, and the "traditionalist" Islamic party Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
With one or another of these parties as nucleus, an aliran was a cluster of 
nationalist organizations—women's clubs, youth groups, boy scouts, charitable 
societies, cooperatives, lending societies, private schools, athletic clubs, religious 
organizations, labor and peasant unions, art groups, trade organizations—sharing 
a similar ideological direction or standpoint and loyalty to the same all-Indonesia 
leadership. There was a PNI peasant organization, a PKI peasant organization, a 
Masjumi peasant organization, and an NU peasant organization; there were PNI, 
PKI, Masjumi, and NU boy scouts, and so on: even the kindergartens divided up 
this way.6
These four party-centered aliran thus corresponded to four well-defined streams in 
Javanese society as identified in Geertz's own taxonomy: "traditionalist" and 
"modernist" santri or devout Moslems (i.e. NU and Masjumi, respectively), Javanist 
abangan commoners (i.e. PKI), and aristocratic prijaji (i.e. PNI). In this context, elections 
constituted more than just an arena for competition over state office and the attendant 
perquisites of power. As Geertz argued, "the election involved a clash of classificatory 
principles, of categories. . .  and its outcome was an adjustment, as much conceptual as 
political." "The election," he concluded, "forced an evidently overdue reconstruction 
of the community's view of itself—of what sort of community it was, of what the 
elements that compose it were, of how they should be organized and expressed in 
public life."7
Cast in the light of a struggle between competing aliran, political conflict in early 
post-independence Indonesia thus appeared not so much as a contest for power, but 
rather as what Geertz characteristically described as "the search for a viable form."8 
Concluding his local case study in the troubled days of 1965, he thus urged the reader 
to consider all recent Indonesian social processes as "importantly shaped by a sense of 
intellectual, moral, and em otional disorientation—by, if not a sense of
4 Geertz's discussion of aliran in this monograph drew heavily on his earlier work. See, in particular, 
Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Village," in G. William Skinner (ed.), Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in 
Village Indonesia: A Symposium (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1959), pp. 34-41; and 
Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).
5 Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 127. The 
resemblance to the religious "sub-cultural groups" called zuilen (pillars) or "blocs" identified as 
undergirding Dutch society and politics is striking, perhaps revealingly so. On Dutch verzuiling (or 
"pillarization"), see: Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the 
Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), especially Chapter n, "A  Nation Divided," 
pp. 16-58.
6 Ibid., pp. 127-28.
7 Ibid., p. 205.
8 Ibid., p. 4.
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meaninglessness, at least a very thorough confusion of meaning—and as conducing 
toward either an increase or decrease of that disorientation."9
Several years later, Geertz wrote in a similar vein more generally about the 
problem of "civil politics" in "the new states," against the larger backdrop of what he 
described as "a whole host of self-reinforcing whirlpools of primordial discontent."10 
In this regard, he cited the anti-Communist massacres of 1965-66 in Indonesia as an 
instance of "extraordinary popular savagery . . . mainly along primordial lines."11 
Laying bare the underlying political agenda of his avowedly "cultural" anthropology, 
Geertz thus concluded:
what the new states—or their leaders—must somehow contrive to do as far as 
primordial attachments are concerned is not, as they have so often tried to do, 
wish them out of existence by belittling them or even denying their reality, but 
domesticate them. They must reconcile them with the unfolding civil order by 
divesting them of their legitimizing force with respect to governmental authority, 
by neutralizing the apparatus of the state in relationship to them, and by 
channeling discontent arising out of their dislocation into properly political rather 
than parapolitical forms of expression.12
In short, Geertz depicted the political conflict and violence of the early post­
independence era in Indonesia as reflecting the dangers of "primordial sentiments" 
untamed and run amok; Suharto's New Order, by contrast, thus appeared as a 
necessary attempt to domesticate and integrate the aliran of Indonesian society.
Against the aliran-centered account of early post-independence Indonesian politics, 
class-based analyses have fared rather poorly. Even the PKI, it has often been argued, 
only very weakly adhered to a class-based strategy, its repeated claims of a united 
front with the "national bourgeoisie" a mere fig leaf for a more narrowly political (and 
opportunistic) alliance with President Sukarno. Moreover, as Rex Mortimer noted 
many years ago, the PKI's own tendency to moderate class appeals, its reliance upon 
patronage and kinship in recruiting among the peasantry, and its alliance with 
Sukarno "set problems for any view which sees as the central issue in post­
independence politics a threat to the elite posed by the social unrest which the PKI in 
part expressed."13 Even accounts which stressed the class-based nature of rural conflict 
in 1964-65 conceded that the aksi sepihak campaigns in East Java typically pitted 
abangan peasant against santri landowner, with class consciousness admittedly 
"incipient."14
Against this backdrop, Robinson's account of Sukamo-era politics in Bali provides 
the most powerful counterpoint to the aliran-centered view of the period. In Hinduized
9 Ibid., p. 207.
10 Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States," in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 276.
11 Ibid., p .282.
12 Ibid., p. 277.
13 Rex Mortimer, "Class, Social Q eavage and Indonesian Communism," Indonesia 8 (October 1969): 11.
14 See, for example, W. F. Wertheim, "From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java," 
Pacific Viewpoint 10 ,2  (September 1969): 1-17.
Dark Play 193
Bali, after all, santri-abangan cleavages were not in evidence, yet political conflict and 
violence culminating in the massacres of 1965-66 were at least as severe as observed in 
East Java. Thus Robinson's account of Balinese politics during the Sukarno period 
recasts the supposedly paradigmatic santri-abangan (NU vs. PKI) conflict in East Java as 
just a single variation on a larger theme, one rooted not in essentialized aliran-based 
cleavages and antagonisms, but in deepening class consciousness and conflict driven 
by an historical confluence of economic and political trends.
Here, the key to Robinson's argument lies in the most interesting and original 
chapters of the book (chapters 8-10) and in his discussion of what he describes as "The 
Struggle for the State, 1950-1965." Following Ben Anderson, Robinson characterizes 
the Sukarno era as one dominated by the tensions between a highly mobilized post­
revolutionary society and a displaced, weak, and fragmented state in the process of 
reconstituting itself.15 The intensity of political party competition during the Sukarno 
period thus reflected the unparalleled extent of political mobilization during and after 
the Revolution, the susceptibility of the state's various apparatuses (most notably the 
local police and military commands) to "capture" by competing political parties, and 
the importance of state-based resources and prerogatives for driving, deepening, and 
ultimately deciding conflicts between rival social forces. In this regard, Robinson's 
careful consideration of rising class conflict in Bali during the aksi sepihak campaigns of 
1964-65 reveals not the mobilization of "traditional" cleavages and antagonisms, but 
rather the impact of shifts in social and economic conditions as well as the intervention 
of state leaders and agencies in national and local arenas.
Overall, the contrast between Robinson's account of Bali in the Sukarno period and 
Geertz's aliran and "primordial sentiments" offers a well-paired match for classroom 
debate, and not merely as an academic exercise for its own sake. In recent months, 
violent "riots" and "disturbances" in various parts of Indonesia have gained 
considerable attention in the local and international media, raising fears about the 
resurgence of so-called SARA (suku, agama, ras, antar-golongan) conflicts in Indonesian 
society and reviving well-worn arguments about the supposed indispensability of an 
authoritarian state for maintaining peace, order, and social harmony in this multi­
ethnic, religiously diverse archipelago. Viewed against the Geertzian backdrop of 
aliran politics and enduring "primordial sentiments," these unfortunate incidents thus 
serve to legitim ize the New Order regime and to discredit arguments for 
democratization in Indonesia.
Yet Robinson's account of Balinese politics during the Sukarno period offers a very 
different lens through which to view recent events in Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, 
Rengasdengklok, and Pontianak, one far more attentive to the role of the Indonesian 
state in generating social conflict. Over the past three decades, the Suharto regime's 
very own policies have been responsible for exacerbating the potential for class, ethnic, 
religious, and regional tensions and resentments in Indonesian society. The regime's 
centralization of power and wealth in Jakarta, promotion of conglomerates owned by 
ethnic Chinese "pariah" capitalists close to the presidential Palace, "transmigration" of 
Javanese to the Outer Islands, and occupation of East Timor since 1975 are only some
15 Benedict Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical 
Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42 (May 1983): 477-4% .
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of the most glaring examples of such policies. In recent years, moreover, the 
government has actively encouraged Muslim leaders to revitalize discussion of the role 
of religion in politics, and in many recent instances of "communal" violence (such as 
the burning of churches in East Java in 1996), the hidden hand of the government is 
reported to have played an instigatory role. As Robinson's analysis suggests, it is no 
coincidence that incidents of so-called "social violence" have occurred with growing 
frequency as the 1997 election approaches and as the succession to Suharto draws 
nearer, causing deep-rooted tensions within the New Order regime to surface, 
intensify, and percolate down to society.
In short, while the details of these unfortunate incidents remain rather murky, a 
revisionist approach to the Sukarno period may offer a measure of much-needed 
historical illumination.16 As Robinson concludes his excellent study of Balinese politics: 
"the roots of loyalty, conflict, and violence in any political community are unlikely to 
be located in primordial givens or in patterns of "traditional" rivalry, but rather in the 
dialectical interplay of historical forces." (313) Today, as Indonesians continue what 
Geertz described as their "search for a viable form," interested observers would do 
well to examine Robinson's timely challenge to the conventional wisdom on 
Indonesia's usable past and its uncertain future.
16 See also the many insightful retrospective essays in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds.), Democracy 
in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 31,1994).
